RECENT CASES
CARRIERS.
The defendant, a corporation engaged in conducting a general moving and express business for hire, agreed to move the plaintiff's household goods from one residence to another in the same
city. In the course of the carriage one of the moving
Carters and
vans caught fire and the goods were injured. The deExpressmen
fendant was held liable on the ground that it was a
Common
common carrier and could not relieve itself from
Carriers.
liability by proof that the fire was not due to any
negligence on the part of its agents. Collier v. Langan & Taylor
Storage & Moving Co., 127 S. W. Rep. (Mo.) 435 (igio).
It seems to be well settled at the present time that persons, who
engage in the business of draymen or truckmen for the transportation of goods and merchandise within a city are common carriers
and are liable for injury to the goods carried in all cases except
where such injury is caused by the act of God or a public enemy.
6 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 2d Ed., pp. 251, 253. Gates v. Bekins,
44 Wash. 422 (19o6). Caye v. Pool's Assignees, io8 Ky. 124 (1goo).
This insurance liability is imposed because of the public nature of
the business, the holding out to the public to carry for hire. Consequently, where the carriage is in pursuance of a special contract to
serve one person only, the employment being therefore private and
not public, this liability does not attach to the carrier. Fancher v.
Wilson, 68 N. H. 338 (1895). The fact that the carrier has no
regular tariff of charges for its work, but did it for a special price,
is immaterial. Also a carrier, which limits its employment to the
mere carriage of particular kinds of property, may be a common carrier
as regards that kind of property and a private carrier as regards
other property entrusted to its care. Jackson Iron Works v. Hurlbut,
158 N. Y. 34 (1899.) No case has gone so far as to hold that a drayman or truckman is a common carrier to the extent that he is bound
to serve the public at large without discrimination. In some cases
this right on the part of the carrier to refuse to carry has been held
to be the proper test in a doubtful case as to whether he is a common
carrier or not. On the other hand, in a recent case it was decided
that the mere fact that one holding himself out as a common carrier
discriminates between patrons, accepting some and rejecting others,
does not absolve him from his liability as a common carrier. Haugh
v. Keenan Storage & Transfer Co., 223 Pa. 148 (igo9).
CONTRACTS.
Although the greater part of the opinion in Trout v. Watkins Livery
& Uzdertaking Co., 130 S. W. Rep. 136 (decided May 31, 1910, St.
Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri), is dicta, the quesContributory tions forming the basis of discussion present some interesting phases of the law of contracts. From the
Negligence
as a Defense In facts before the Court, it appeared that the defendant
was a corporation engaged in the livery business. For
an Action on
Contract
a consideration paid by plaintiff, it agreed to carry her
from a hospital, where she had been undergoing treatment for illness, to her home. The carriage used was a heavy, enclosed
(5)
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vehicle, the bottom of which approached to within fourteen inches of
the ground. The driver, when about five or six blocks from plaintiff's house, notified her that it would be impossible to continue the
journey on account of the muddy condition of the streets. Plaintiff
and her sister informed him of plaintiff's inability to walk, although
this should have been obvious to him from the fact that plaintiff
had been assisted to the carriage by her sister and a nurse. Plaintiff
and her sister also suggested to the driver that he procure another
conveyance. The driver communicated the situation to his employer
by telephone, and told plaintiff of the alternatives his "boss" offered.
These were to return plaintiff to the hospital or to bring her to defendant's livery barn and there transfer her into a storm buggy, by
means of which she would be conveyed to her home. The driver was
told that plaintiff's condition was such that she could not withstand
the strain of either of these trips. Finally plaintiff was taken home
by the family grocer, to whom she had sent word of her plight. The
conveyance he used was an open one, and upon reaching the house
of her next door neighbor she was seized with a chill. The testimony further showed that plaintiff caught a severe cold which resulted in a protracted illness.
The lower Court directed a verdict for the defendant, apparently
on the ground that plaintiff had voluntarily waived her right to insist
upon a completion of the contract of carriage. The appellate Court
decided that the facts on the record did not tend to indicate such
waiver, and that, therefore, the lower Court had erred. The Court
then proceeded to discuss the questions involved with a view to the
future disposition of the case. One of the objections on the part of
defendant was that to consider the question of defendant's failure
to exercise ordinary care for the sick passenger would, as a corelative
thereof, permit the introduction of evidence tending to prove contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff, and thus introduce an anomaly to the effect that contributory negligence may be put forward
as a defense in a suit on contract. The Court dismissed the objection as untenable, and cited one of its own cases, Francis v. St. Louis
Traisfer Co., 5 Mo. App. 7, and a Massachusetts case, Ingraham v.
Pullinan Co., igo-Mass. 33, 76 N. E. 237, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) io87, as
precedents that in such actions, plaintiff's negligence, contributing to
the injury, is admissible as a defense. It is submitted, however, that
the cases cited do no more than to illustrate the well-recognized principle that it is the duty of a person injured, either by the tort or breach
of contract of another, to take steps to minimize the damages. The
facts showed that in both cases the actions of the respective plaintiffs
did not minimize, but aggravated the original injuries. Negligent
though such acts on the part of the plaintiff in each of these cases
undoubtedly were, it is inaccurate to say that they contributed to the
injury produced by the breach of contract. As a matter of fact, the
breach of contract was complete before plaintiff acted at all, hence
what he subsequently did could have no greater effect than to aggravate the injury caused by the breach. And as the defendant is responsible only for damages occasioned as a natural and proximate result of the breach, of course, he could not be held liable for damages
resulting from plaintiff's own acts after the breach had been complete. It is submitted that it is on this ground, and not on any theory
of contributory negligence, that the actions of plaintiff subsequent to
the breach of contract are admissible as a defense in a suit by him for
damages caused by such breach.
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CRIMES.
On an appeal from a conviction for murder in the first degree in
the case of Milo v. State, 127 S. W. Rep. (19IO) io2, an interesting
point was made on the following facts: The defendant
Murder
had been one of a band of conspirators who had plotted
in Course of
to rob one A and who repaired armed, to his tent for
Robbery
the purpose of carrying out their design. On their
entrance through the door, one B, who was in the tent,
endeavored to get out and was deliberately shot to death.
The point raised on the appeal was that since the intended robbery
was planned against A, the killing of B, an outsider and one totally
outside the scope of the conspiracy, was not a killing done in the commission of a robbery and hence not murder in the first degree under
the statute.
The Court, however, did not take this view of the case, but held
that the statute by its language included any killing done while in
the perpetration of robbery, without regard to whether the victim was
the person the robbery of whom was intended or not. The conviction
in the lower Court was therefore affirmed, it would seem on a fair
and reasonable construction of the statute.
DAMAGES.
In Texas & P. Ry Co. v. Corr et al., 130 S. W. Rep. 185, decided
June 9, igio, (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas), one of the questions discussed by the Court involved the law of conContribution
tribution as between wrongdoers. The suit was instibetween
tuted by C to recover for damage to his furniture, etc.,
Wrongdoers
resulting from a derailed car coming in contact with his
house, situated within a few feet of the track of the A
Railway Co. While some of the cars of this company were being
pushed along the track near the building one of them became derailed,
struck the wall of the house, and caused the damage complained of.
The A Co. sought to have the B Traction Co. made a party defendant,
in order that it might have judgment over against it for whatever
sum C might recover. It was alleged that the traction company had
constructed a line of street railway which intersected the track of the
A Co. near the building occupied by C; that the traction company
unskillfully constructed its switches, rails and appurtenances, and negligently failed to keep same in proper order and repair, so that at
the time of the accident named it was in an unsafe and improper
condition; and that if the cars of the A Co. left the track and ran
against the building occupied by C, it was directly caused by the
negligence of the traction company, and for which it was liable. Both
the traction company and C, the appellee, appeared and excepted to
this portion of the answer. Both exceptions were sustained, which
action was alleged as error.
In affirming the judgment, the Court said that there were instances
in which the right of a wrongdoer to have contribution from another
in case of recovery by the injured party was recognized, but the rule
did not apply where the party seeking contribution was morally, as
well as legally, at fault. The Court stated that true it was, the defect
was at the point where its track was crossed by that of the traction
company, but that fact did not relieve it from the duty of keeping its
track at that point in repair. It will be noted that, although the Court
decided that there could be no contribution on account of the rule it
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stated, the facts were such as to bring the case out of reach of any
doctrine of contribution. As viewed by the Court, they established on
the railway company a duty of keeping its track in proper condition,
this duty not being affected by any acts on the part of the traction
company as to the track at the point of intersection by the latter's
tracks. The rule, as stated by the Court, refuses contribution where
the one seeking it is morally at fault, and appears to bear out the
statement of Mr. Sedgwick, who states that the old rule that there
can be contribution between wrongdoers has been much trenched upon.
"So many exceptions have in fact been engrafted upon it," says he,
"that it is practically confined to cases of active participation in acts or
omissions recognized by the wrongdoers as torts." Sedgwick, Elements
of Law of Damages, (2nd Ed.), p. 150, and cases there cited.

EVIDENCE.
In an action brought by the heirs to recover death benefits for the
death of their ancestor, one of the defences offered by the beneficial
association, defendant, was that the deceased came to
Public Health

his death by reason of his own improper conduct, to

wit, the excessive use of alcohol, and that by the rules
of the association no death benefits were recoverable in
such case. To sustain this contention, it offered in
evidence the public health records of the City of Evansville, Ind., on the question of the cause of death of the
deceased. The Court refused to permit the introduction of this evidence. On appeal, the Appellate Court sustained the ruling of the
Court below. Brotherhood of Painters,D. & P. v. Barton, (Appellate
Court of Indiana), 93 N. E. 64 (1gio).
The plaintiff claimed that the evidence was admissible under the
Records.
When
Admissible to
Prove Cause of
Death

act of the General Assembly, Acts 19o7, page 246; Acts 19o9, page 343.

The Act of 197ois as follows: "An act to collect accurate records
of deaths, births, contagious diseases and marriages, prescribing the
duties of the State Board of Health, and of all health officers, in
relation thereto, providing penalties for the violation of this act, and
repealing all acts in conflict." The act among other things makes it
the duty of all physicians to report to the health officers named therein
upon blank forms supplied by the State Board of Health all deaths
and births which occur under their supervision, and provides that all
records of deaths shall be kept by the proper health officers in record
books, the form of which shall be supplied by the State Board of
Health; that any physician refusing or neglecting to make death reports as provided in this act shall upon conviction be fined, etc."
* * * It also provides for the recording of marriages and births
and contagious diseases; that the State Board of Health shall collect
and tabulate the vital statistics. The Act of io9 specifies the duties
of the various health officers in connection with the aforesaid records.
There is a division of opinion as to the admissibility of the evidence
rejected in this case. The reasons for its rejection as given in those
decisions in accord with the present authority and summarized in the
opinion of the Court are as follows: (i) That the health records are
a part of the police regulations of the state for the protection of the
health of the people of the state and are prima facie evidence of
the facts therein set forth so far as questions arising under its pro-
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EVIDENCE (Continued).
visions which involve public rights; but that it was not the intention
of the legislature to change the common-law rule of evidence in controversies of private parties growing out of contract, and that such
records being ex parte, the provisions of the statute should not be
construed as applicable to such cases; (2) that such records, if signed
by a physician contain matter relating to his patient which the
physician is not allowed to disclose as a witness upon the trial against
the objection of his patient or those representing him, and that it
would be unjust to permit the use of the record where the testimony
of the physician would be incompetent, and (3) that it would be
hearsay evidence.
In Davis v. Supreme Lodge K. of H., 165 N. Y. 159, 58 N. E. 891,
the Court said: "It may well be that the records are competent to
prove the fact of death, or prove marriages or births. It is quite possible that in some cases they might be competent on questions relating
to pedigree. These facts could always, at common law, be established
by a species of hearsay evidence, but the cause of death in an obligation between private parties concerning the obligation of a contract
of life insurance must be established, when material, by common law
proof, and that is precisely what this Court has held."
Contra, see the following cases, Hennessy v. Ins. Co., 74 Conn. 699;
State v. McDonald. Or. 104 Pac. 967; Allen v. Kidd, 197 Mass. 256"
Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N. J. Eq. 91o; and State v. Pabst, 139 Wis.
361. See also the dissenting opinion of Roby, J., in the present case.

NEGLIGENCE.
A regulation of the Relief Association declared, that the acceptance
by a member of benefits for an injury released the road from liability
incurred as a result of it. This is pronounced void in
RailroadRellef Borden v. Atlantic Coast Line Railway Co., 67 S. E.
Association
(N. Ca.) 971 (I9IO). The plaintiff was employed by the
Regulations
defendant and paid dues as a member of the Relief
Association maintained by the latter. Membership was
voluntary. The objects of the association were to provide medical
attendance for sick and injured members, to pay benefits to members
incapacitated for work owing to illness or injuries, and in case of
death, to their families. It is unincorporated and is administered as a
department of the railway. The plaintiff became ill and underwent an
operation at the hands of the Relief Association surgeon, and in consequence of the latter's negligence, he was permanently injured, for
which he sued.
The actual decision of the case was that the Relief Association was
a charity and as the complaint failed to allege a careless selection of
the surgeon, the defendant's demurrer must be sustained. But the
major part of Manning, J.'s opinion deals with the legality of the
regulation mentioned at the beginningb-f this article. On the ground
that it is an ingenious scheme devised by the company to avoid
responsibility for its negligence, he holds it void. This reasoning is
attacked by Brown, J., in his opinion. He points out, that in all
jurisdictions where the question has been presented, it has been held
valid, for the reason that the regulation in no way absolves the company from the legal consequences of its negligence, but merely provides in the event of the injured person accepting the benefits offered,
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he can't also sue the company. Pennsylvania decisions on this point
are contained in Graft v. B. & 0. R. Co., 8 At. 206 (1887) ; Johnson
v. P & R. R. Co., 163 Pa. 127 (1894), and Ringle v. P. R. R., 164 Pa.
529 (1894). A long list of decisions in various jurisdictions is appended by Brown, J.
A recent Pennsylvania case, Bailey & Co. v. The Western Untion
Telegraph Co., 227 Pa. 522 (igi), sustained a recovery in tort by
the recipient of a telegram, of the actual damages incurred as a result of acting upon a telegram, the wordTelegraph
ing of which had been changed in transmission. The
Companies
Liability
plaintiffs were commission merchants. They received
to
a
Recipient
a message from a manufacturing company reading:
of a
Telegram
"Anxious that you sell summer deliveries of decade at
for an Error in chapel." Chapel was a code word meaning four and
Transmission seven-eighths cents per yard. They contracted to sell
at this price. It was then discovered that the word
chapel should have been chaplet, which meant five cents per yard.
The plaintiffs accordingly had to pay the one-eighth cent per yard in
fulfillment of their obligations. They brought suit against the telegraph company to recover this sum. The principal defense was,
that the message was an unrepeated one and under the stipulation on
the telegraph blank, no liability attached in such a case.
The Court held, that this was not binding upon the recipient of a
telegram and for the negligent transmission of an intelligible message an action in tort would lie. This is in accord with the earlier
Pennsylvania cases on the subject. See The New York and Washington Printing Telegraph Co. v. Dryburg, 35 Pa. 298 (i86o), Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Richman, ig W. N. C. 569 (1887). As is said
in the opinion of Mestrezat, J., a different rule prevails in England
and in some jurisdictions' in this country. The cases are collected and
discussed in an essay, entitled "Suggestions as to the nature and
extent of the liability of telegraph companies for failures to properly
deliver messages," written by Mr. Morris Wolf, of the Philadelphia
Bar, and published by the Department of Law, of the University of
Pennsylvania.
The decision in the case of the Santa Rita, 176 Fed. Rep. (9 C. C. A.
Feb. i9io), 89o, has been reversed in the Circuit Court of Appeals.
The decision of the Appellate Court justifies the critiProximate
cism in this department (58 Am. Law Review, pp, 3o6-9,
Cause
"Negligence as the Proximate Cause of Injury") of the
decision of the Court below.
It will be remembered that fuel oil had escaped into the hold of
a vessel at anchor in San Francisco Bay, and was pumped into the
bay therefrom where it and a wharf taking fire, the fire was communicated by it to another vessel in the harbor.
The discharge of the oil into the bay was in violation of a penal
statute; and counsel devoted their argument on appeal to its effect.
The Court unanimously declared, however, that liability clearly existed
independent of the statute. Tested by the rule of Milwaukee Ry. Co.
v. Kellogg, 94 U. S.469, they found the injury to be "the natural and
probable consequences of the negligent or wrongful act, and that it
ought to have been foreseen in the light of the attendant circumstances."
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To store dynamite in a vacant unlocked structure on an unfenced
lot, where, to the knowledge of the defendants, boys frequently went
been held actionable
has Investment
Pac.
Co., O8 negotherwise,
or v.
Gill Home
(Olsont
Dynamite Sy ligence.
as trespassers
f place

[Wash. 191o] 14o). We have no fault to find with the
decisions; but it is barely possible that the Court should
not have so strongly asserted that the case "is stronger
Negligence
than the turntable cases" on account of boys' natural
fondness for noise. Is it a matter of judicial knowledge that this is
greater than their fondness for dangerous machinery?
While these acts of boys could have been foreseen, yet it could not
have been reasonably anticipated (Finkbeiner v. Solomon, 225 Pa.
333), that boys would discover and play with a box of dynamite caps
put on a dark shelf in a barn which was being moved through a
village. Certainly, the possible possession of a dangerous toy was
not held out to them, as in a preceding case.
Frequented by
Boys held

PROPERTY.
In a recent case decided by the Supreme judicial Court of the
State of Maine, it was decided that the storm doors and windows
came properly under the designation fixtures, and, as
Are Storm.
such, passed upon the sale of the property. Roderick v.
windows
and
Storm-doors
Fixtures?

Sanborn, 78 Atlantic, 283 (1910).
In that case, the plaintiff, in February, 1907, mort-

gaged to the defendant the dwelling house, in which
she and her husband resided, the title to the same being
in the name of the wife. In October of the same year the plaintiff
conveyed the premises to the defendant by warranty deed. At the
time of the mortgage, but not at the time of the warranty-deed, the
doors and windows aforesaid were attached to the house in the
usual manner by means of screws passing through the double windowframes and into the window-casings of the house and by means of
screws passing through hinges on the doors and into the frame of
the door-casing. Each window-frame was fitted to a particular
window-casing on the building and the window-casings were numbered consecutively from one upwards, and the double windows were
numbered to correspond, so that it might be readily determined to
which window-casing each outside or double window was designed
to be attached and used. In the spring of each year the double
windows and doors were removed and stored on the premises, where
they remained until attached to the house the next winter, when they
would be replaced in their places on the building until the following
spring. Their purpose was to make the house more comfortable for
use.

The Court said that the old tests of physical annexation have been
discarded and now the modern trend of authority is adverse to any
arbitrary or fixed rule by which it may be determined whether a chattel is or is not a fixture. Following the case of Hayword v. Wentworth (97 Me. 374, 54 At. 940), it laid down the rule that a chattel is
not merged in the realty unless (i) it is physically annexed, at least
by juxtaposition, to the realty or some appurtenance thereof; (2) it
is adapted to and usable with that part of the realty to which it 'is
Annexed; and (3) it was annexed with the intention, to make it a
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permanent accession to the realty. This annexation need not be
physical for it may be constructive as well as actual. It is sufficient
if the owner duly manifests his intention to make the chattel a
part of the realty.
From the facts of this case, a summary of which is given above,
the Court found the necessary degree of annexation.

REAL PROPERTY.
The defendant in the course of building operations on his own
land excavated close to the boundary line between himself and the
plaintiff his neighbor. The latter's house situated within
Lateral
a few feet of the line, fell into this excavation, solely
Support:
as the complaint alleged, because of the negligent manLiability for
Negligence in
Excavating

ner of carrying on the excavating work. The defendant was held liable for the injury caused to the land

and the building.

(W. Va.) io87 (igio).

Walker v. Strosnider, 67 S. E. Rep.

SIn a lengthy opinion the right of lateral support as between adjoining landowners is thoroughly discussed. The underlying principles
are recognized as well settled. A land owner is entitled from his
neighbor to the lateral support of his soil in its natural condition.
This is a property right, and so, if his neighbor in excavating on his
own land causes this soil to cave in, he is liable, irrespective of the
question of negligence in the manner of excavating. Bohrer v. Dienhwrt Harness Co., 49 N. E. 296 (1898); Schultz v. Bower 57 Minn.
493 (1894). However, there is no such right to lateral support for
buildings erected on one's land, and so one, who excavates on his
own land, is not liable for injury resulting from such excavations to
buildings on the adjoining land. This rule has been qualified, and
the excavating owner is now liable, if the injury is due to the negligent manner of carrying on the work. Liability is imposed in this
case not because of any infringement of another's property right,
but because of a failure to observe the maximum "sic ittere tuo ut
alienum non laedas." Myer v. Hobbs, 57 Ala. 175 (1876). Bass v.
West, iio Ga. 698 (19oo).
No hard and fast rule has been laid down and there is some conflict of opinion as to what is sufficient negligence to render the excavating owner liable for injury to adjoining buildings. It is a question depending largely on the circumstances of the particular case.
Where the injury is due to active misconduct on the defendant's part,
such as piling bricks in a street, so as to cause water to flow into the
excavation and thereby causing the injury, the defendant is universally
held liable. Bohrer v. Denhart Co., supra. Our principal case goes
further and holds that in cases of temporary excavation, where the
digging is merely incidental to building purposes, the defendant is
bound to underpin or shore up his neighbor's foundation walls, if
such measures would be taken by a prudent man to protect his own
property. This would seem to be against the weight of decided
authority. The majority of cases hold that under such circumstances
it is not negligent in the defendant failing to take active steps to
protect his neighbor's property, but that the plaintiff should bear the
cost of protecting his own building. Block v. Haseltine, 29 N. E.
937 (1892) ; Ebert v. Dunn, 140 Mo. 476 (1897); Peyton v. Loudon, 9
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B. & C. 725 (1829); Contra, Geldersleeve v. Hammond, iog Mich.
431 (1896). In Pennsylvania the whole question of negligence is left
to the jury with instructions to find for the plaintiff, if the defendant has not acted as a reasonable man would under the same circumstances. Spohit v. Dives, 174 Pa. 474 (1896).
As to the question of giving notice to the adjoining owner of an
intention to excavate, it is in accord with the general rule, that failure
to give such notice is not sufficient to render the excavating owner
liable, provided the work has been carried on in a careful, prudent
manner. Manier v. Lussem, 65 Ill. 484 (1872); Bonaparte v. Wiseman, 87 Md. 12 (899); Contra, Schultz v. Byers, 53 N. J. L. 442
(1891).

